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In 2013 the candidate published Operation Crossbow: The Untold Story of 
Photographic Intelligence and the Search for Hitler’s V Weapons. Through a detailed 
examination of the relevant primary sources – including aerial photography recently 
released to the National Collection of Aerial Photography in Edinburgh - this book 
investigates the role of British photographic interpretation in the hunt for German V-
weapons during Operation Crossbow. In so doing, it provides a wealth of information 
on such matters as the wartime development of photographic interpretation, the 
techniques used by the interpreters, the personalities involved, the significance of 
photographic intelligence to the operation, and the wider politics of wartime 
intelligence. In particular, it contests some of the claims made by R. V. Jones in his 
memoir, Most Secret War (1978), about the role of photographic interpretation in the 
Crossbow investigation. It also demonstrates the wider importance of photographic 
intelligence in the British military history of the war and offers some explanation as to 
why this has become a ‘missing dimension’ of wartime intelligence studies. The 
critical review seeks to provide an academic superstructure for the book, which was 
intended for a general readership, and demonstrates that the research included therein 
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The purpose of this critical review is to summarise the aims and objectives, 
methodology, and the results and conclusions, of the candidate’s book - Operation 
Crossbow: The Untold Story of Photographic Intelligence and the Search for Hitler’s 
V Weapons - first published in the United Kingdom by Preface Publishing in 2013.  
This publication provides a case study of the role of photographic intelligence during 
Operation Crossbow (the operation to track down the German V-weapons between 
1943 and 1945) in order to draw wider conclusions about the value of this source of 
military intelligence during the Second World War and the value of declassified 
military aerial photography for academic historians.  As the book was written with a 
general readership in mind, this critical review provides an academic superstructure 
that demonstrates how the research undertaken contributes to the expansion of 
knowledge in the field of academic intelligence studies, and why the research project 
has academic merit commensurate with a PhD.  
 
 
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
To demonstrate why the book fills a gap in the published literature, and makes an 
original contribution to knowledge, it is necessary firstly to provide an overview of 
the secondary literature on the application of photographic intelligence during 
Operation Crossbow, and more generally during the Second World War.  This is 
achieved by reviewing the key published sources: official histories; memoirs that can 
be partly classed as secondary sources; and other published histories.  By reviewing 
this literature, the historiography relating to this form of military intelligence provides 
an academic context for the research within the milieu of intelligence warfare.  
Following this review, the aims and objectives of the book are explained in the form 







In contrast to the secrecy that surrounded code-breaking at the Government Code and 
Cypher School at Bletchley Park, after VJ Day a press conference was held at RAF 
Medmenham (a country house located near Marlow in Buckinghamshire) on 5 





  Whilst the resultant articles published about the intelligence 
warfare undertaken by the Allied Central Interpretation Unit (ACIU) at Medmenham 
were small in number and only featured in specialist British aviation magazines,
3
 the 
revelation that photographic intelligence played a central role during Crossbow would 
shortly draw a larger, and international, audience.  Coinciding with the publication of 
an official history of the European Air War by the United States Strategic Bombing 
Survey,
4
 which included a statistical analysis of Crossbow
5
 - the resultant press 
coverage focused on Flight Officer Constance Babington Smith,
6
 and indelibly 
connected her to a story that produced many myths at the time and later.   
 
A photographic interpreter in the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF), Babington 
Smith was officer-in-charge of the Aircraft Section at Medmenham from its creation 
in April 1941 until her 1945 secondment to the Pentagon after VE Day.  Whilst 
serving at the Washington, D. C.-based headquarters of the War Department with the 
United States Army Air Force,
7
 Babington Smith was tasked with presenting an 
officially-prescribed briefing to the American press about Crossbow.  As a result of 
the press conference at the New York office of the British Information Service, 
Babington Smith was hailed as the individual who ensured the Normandy landings 
were carried out without interference from V-weapons
8
 - a claim she personally 
repudiated, arguing that the elucidation of vital intelligence was entirely the result of a 
team effort.
9
  Nonetheless, the resultant press coverage included the comic-book 
proposition that she was the ‘WAAF with X-ray eyes’,
10
 a distortion that proved to be 
a convenient cover for the true nature of photographic intelligence.  Such historical 
manipulation serves to highlight the challenge for historians in judging the relative 






As early as 1941 the Cabinet Office began to consider the post-war publication of 
official military histories that would provide ‘a broad survey from an Inter-Service 
point of view, rather than separate accounts by each of the three services’.
11
  In order 
to best ensure the objectivity of these historical narratives, an advisory panel was 
created under the chairmanship of an academic historian, Professor James Butler, 
which consisted of senior military figures, civil servants and historians.  The Cabinet 
Office duly commissioned the production of a specialised multi-volume series - under 
the umbrella title History of the Second World War - for publication by Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office.  In the resultant official history published between 1979 and 1990 - 
British Intelligence in the Second World War - a chronological account of the part 
intelligence warfare played in allied strategy and operations throughout the conflict 
was presented.  This charted the evolution of British intelligence organisations and the 
challenge of wresting information from the enemy to the point where the distilled and 
evaluated information was presented to military commanders and political leaders.   
 
In the third volume of the series, an assessment of the importance of intelligence in 
the identification of the V-weapons,
12
 the associated offensives against them, and the 
effect they had on the course of the war,
13
 was provided.  However, based on a review 
of the intelligence briefings supplied to the chiefs of staff, rather than any systematic 
study of the photographic intelligence created at Medmenham, this macro-level study 
failed to investigate the scale and complexity of the photographic interpretation effort 
during the operation.  This serves to highlight the value of a micro-level interpretation 
that considers the inner workings of the intelligence unit at Medmenham, the 
conventions by which the photographic interpreters operated, and the specific 
challenges tackled during the investigation.  Indeed, the principal author of the 
official history, the wartime cryptographer Sir Harry Hinsley, readily acknowledged 
that photographic intelligence was one of the key sources of military intelligence 
during the conflict, alongside physical contact (captured documents, mail censorship, 
prisoner interrogation), espionage, and signals intelligence.
14




Memoirs that are in part secondary sources 
 
The important contribution of published memoirs to the historiography of 
photographic intelligence during Crossbow, and more generally during the Second 
World War, can be demonstrated through a study of selected examples of the genre.  
Following demobilisation, from 1946 Babington Smith worked as a researcher for 
Life magazine, where her major assignment was to assemble illustrations for 
Churchill’s influential six-volume part history/part wartime memoir,
15
 The Second 
World War, which includes chapters on ‘Hitler’s Secret Weapon’
16
 and ‘The Pilotless 
Bombardment’.
17
  In spite of the value Churchill placed on photographic intelligence, 
not least because his daughter Sarah served as a Medmenham interpreter, Churchill 
chose to refer to the intelligence unit only once in passing.
18
 This marginalisation of 
such a significant intelligence unit in Churchill’s magnum opus  - alongside the total 
absence of any reference to the codebreaking undertaken at Bletchley Park, for 
reasons of national security - arguably set a precedent for the treatment of 
photographic intelligence in the history of the Second World War.   
 
Meanwhile, based on privileged access to the then still-classified wartime 
photographic interpretation reports and associated Air Ministry records, eyewitness 
testimony, and in-part her first-hand wartime experiences, the first published history 
of photographic intelligence during the Second World War was written by Babington 
Smith.  First appearing in the United States as Air Spy
19
 in 1957, and promoted 
through a Life magazine article, ‘How Photographic Detectives Solved Secret 
Weapon Mystery’,
20
 in 1958 the book was published in the United Kingdom as 
Evidence In Camera,
21
 after having been serialised in The Sunday Times newspaper.
22
  
Although the publication can be considered part-memoir, and thus a primary source, 
since the author interprets, discusses and analyses sources of information relating to 
aspects of photographic intelligence beyond her direct wartime experience - and given 
the influence of the publication on the development of the historiography - it also has 






Whilst the derring-do narrative reflects the author’s journalistic background, the book 
accurately charts the development and growth of photographic intelligence in the 
European theatre of operations.  It includes a chapter dedicated to the battle against 
the V-weapons, which is presented as the zenith of the interpreters’ achievements 
during the conflict. Given the seminal status afforded to this publication in the 
secondary sources reviewed, any scholarly assessment of wartime photographic 
intelligence must draw on the Babington Smith narrative. But it was of course not 
intended for a scholarly readership and the author did not have access to all the 
primary sources. 
 
In the same year that Evidence in Camera was reprinted, The Ultra Secret (1974) 
appeared.
24
 This work, written by Frederick Winterbotham, who masterminded the 
organisation, distribution and security of signals intelligence code-named ‘Ultra’ 
throughout the war, revealed the work of the code breakers at Bletchley Park. In the 
introduction to his influential work, which was a turning point in the evolution of 
intelligence studies,
25
 Winterbotham signposted the value of photographic intelligence 
as the primary source of accurate ground intelligence during the conflict, and 
beyond.
26
  Yet this observation drew attention to the fact that as long as the aerial 
photography created during the war remained classified, its inaccessibility had an 
inhibiting effect on the writing of operational military history. 
 
Shortly thereafter a dispute broke out among memoirists. In 1978 the wartime memoir 
of Dr. R. V. Jones – Most Secret War – was published.  This provided a chronological 
account of his role as the Assistant Director of Intelligence (Science) at the Air 
Ministry, anticipating the ‘German applications of science to warfare’. It also 
included his interactions with the photographic interpreters during Crossbow.
27
  
Through the careful presentation - and exclusion - of factual material Jones 
questioned the competency of the interpretation effort.  The veteran Medmenham 
interpreter, Ursula Powys-Lybbe, was so disappointed by his ‘marked lack of 
objectivity in his approach to the subject’ that she was galvanised into action.
28
  Her 
1983 publication, The Eye of Intelligence, included a chapter on Crossbow in which 
the assertions by Jones about the Medmenham interpreters were challenged.  Since 
the veracity of both interpretations could only be judged following the subsequent 
declassification of wartime aerial photography and associated public records, they 
6 
 
underscored the importance and value of exploiting primary source evidence to set the 
record straight. The case for such a reassessment was made more compelling by 
James Goodchild’s doctoral thesis, ‘R.V. Jones and the Birth of Scientific 
Intelligence’ (2013),
29
 which identified further doubts about the reliability of Jones’s 
wartime memoir.  
 
Other published histories 
 
There is a limited treatment of Second World War photographic intelligence – and its 
role in Crossbow in particular - in other published historical works. Coinciding with 
the twentieth anniversary of the first deployment of V weapons against the United 
Kingdom, in 1964 two volumes on Crossbow appeared.  In The Battle of the V 
Weapons (1944-1945),
30
 Basil Collier - author of the official The Defence of the 
United Kingdom during the Second World War
31
 - drew on that aforementioned 
history, and other published sources, to provide a documentary account of the V-
weapons offensives. But in the process he simply raised a series of further questions 
about the role of military intelligence in the operation.
32
   
 
In The Mare’s Nest,
33
 David Irving charted the involvement of the different branches 
of military intelligence in the operation, the challenge to the Allies in interpreting the 
intelligence, and the German debate over the deployment of these revolutionary 
weapons.  Yet when Duncan Sandys, the wartime Chairman of the Crossbow 
Committee, reviewed Irving’s volume for the London Evening Standard, he faulted 
him for his reliance on the papers of Lord Cherwell, the Prime Minister’s Chief 
Scientific Advisor, along with information provided by R. V. Jones.  By treating the 
V-weapon challenge as principally one of scientific intelligence, Sandys considered 





More recently, the value of photographic intelligence during Crossbow was 
reconsidered by Colonel Roy Stanley II (retired) in V Weapons Hunt: Defeating 
German Secret Weapons (2010).  Inspired to become a photographic interpreter after 
reading Babington Smith’s Air Spy,
35
 Stanley has written a series of books on 
photographic intelligence, principally from an American-centric perspective. In V 
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Weapons Hunt Stanley took a selection of ‘notable’ aerial photographs created during 
Crossbow and advanced the hypothesis that whilst a number of authors have 
investigated the Allies search for secret German weapons, and some have considered 
photographic intelligence, most have not evaluated the aerial photography.  
Furthermore, he postulates that some published works are frequently found to be 
incorrect.
  36
These conclusions have helped to inform the research project. Meanwhile, 
the television producer and historian, Taylor Dowing, has produced Spies in the Sky 
(2011) for a more popular readership. Appearing in the wake of the BBC television 
documentary Operation Crossbow,
37
 the author utilises unpublished personal 
memoirs held in the Medmenham Collection and oral history interviews with veteran 
photographic interpreters.  But the book is reliant on the extant secondary literature 
and only scratches the surface of the primary sources now available.  
  
In a wider historiographical sense, the potential use of aerial photography for military 
historians was advanced considerably by Ian Daglish’s Operation Goodwood 
(2005).
38
 In this volume, he questioned historical assumptions about the Normandy 
campaign through an analysis of stereoscopic aerial photography taken above the 
battlefield whilst the largest tank battle of the north-west Europe campaign of 1944-
1945 was in progress.  Using the photographic evidence, the accuracy of eyewitness 
testimony was challenged and a revised chronology was advanced that contradicted 
aspects of the official history.  As the lessons learned from this battlefield influenced 
the development of NATO strategy for the defence of Europe against the Warsaw 
Pact’s armoured divisions, this work highlighted the capacity of historical 
misunderstandings to influence the development of subsequent military strategy.
39
  In 
companion volumes Daglish applied similar techniques to studies of Operation 
Epsom
40
 and Operation Bluecoat.
41
  In so doing, he demonstrates how a detailed study 
of air intelligence can serve to re-interpret military operations, including Crossbow. 
 
Professor Robert Ehlers has followed this trend in Targeting the Third Reich (2009).  
In his book, he uses aerial photography to reassess the effectiveness of the wartime 
Allied strategic bombing campaign and, through this, draws attention to the close 
working relationship that developed between British and American air intelligence; 
the inter-Allied nature of the photographic interpretation effort at Medmenham; and 
how this inter-played ‘synergistically with the world’s best signals intelligence and 
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cryptographic units at Bletchley Park’ to ensure the bombing effort targeted the right 
targets, at the right intervals, with the optimum payload.
42
  The combinative value of 
signals and photographic intelligence was also highlighted in Christy Campbell’s 
Target London (2102).
43
 Both these publications further suggested the time was ripe 
for a re-evaluation of Crossbow. 
 
In a different historiographical context, Christine Halsall has recently considered the 
gender aspects of photographic intelligence in Women of Intelligence (2012).
44
 In this 
volume, the wartime lives of servicewomen who worked at Medmenham, many of 
whom subsequently joined interpretation units in the Middle East and India, were 
conveyed through a series of character studies.  The author demonstrated that since a 
substantial proportion of its photographic specialists were women, who ranked 
equally to their male colleagues, and in some cases were their superiors (examples 
including Constance Babington Smith and Ursula Powys-Lybbe), Medmenham 
distinguished itself from other service establishments in that tasks and responsibility 
were allocated according to merit, rather than gender.  But the book makes no 
pretence at re-evaluating Crossbow. 
 
This literature review indicates that whilst British photographic intelligence was 
considered a key source of military intelligence during the war, the dearth of 
independent academic studies has constrained the development of knowledge about, 
and understanding of, the applied use of wartime aerial photography, and its role in 
Crossbow in particular.  This desire to fill a gap in the literature inspired the candidate 
to write his book, Operation Crossbow, a project that only became possible, as is 
explained below, when classified wartime aerial photographs were released into the 




The over-arching aim of the candidate’s book Operation Crossbow was to use the 
primary source evidence now available to produce a comprehensive new study of the 
role of photographic interpretation in the Allies search for the German V-weapons. 
This would be a chronologically-driven account that covered all aspects of the hunt 
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for these weapons. But, mining down, two research questions in particular informed 
the writing of the book:  
 
Research Question 1:  This first question takes as its starting point the controversy 
over the claims made by Dr. R. V. Jones about the role of photographic interpretation 
in Operation Crossbow (as outlined in the literature review above). On the basis of the 
intelligence briefings provided, and the conventions under which they operated, were 
the claims made by Jones about the competency of their photographic interpretation 
effort during Operation Crossbow reasonable? 
 
Research Question 2: This builds on the first to widen out the project. What can a 
study of Crossbow tell us about the importance of British photographic intelligence 
during the Second World War, and can it be considered a significant ‘missing 






In order to write this new study of the role of photographic interpretation in the Allies 
search for the German V-weapons, and in so doing address the research questions 
outlined above, a wide range of primary sources were exploited during the research 
project.  The key archives used in the UK were: The National Archives of the United 
Kingdom (TNA); the Medmenham Collection at the Military Intelligence Museum 
(MC); the National Collection of Aerial Photography (NCAP); and the Imperial War 
Museum (IWM). The key archives used in the USA were: the Air Force Historical 
Research Agency (AFHRA); and National Archives and Records Administration 
(NARA).  The key primary records exploited can be categorised as follows:  Second 
World War aerial photographs and associated interpretation reports; unpublished 
histories and related documents; RAF Operations Record Books (Form 540); wartime 





Aerial Photography and Interpretation Reports 
  
The aerial photography and associated interpretation reports created during Operation 
Crossbow were a key source of primary information exploited in the book.  Since 
1972, the wartime photographic interpretation reports which record detailed 
intelligence elucidated in mono and three-dimensions have been publicly available in 
the TNA record series AIR/29 and AIR/34.  However, this was in some ways 
unsatisfactory for historians since the interpretation reports infrequently included 
copies of the aerial photographs they describe. Although some photographs were 
made publicly available during the Cold War era, the opportunity for scholars to 
undertake a comprehensive re-assessment of the photographic intelligence created 
during Operation Crossbow has only been practical following the extensive release of 
Second World War aerial photography by the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence 




Although searches for imagery of specific places is limited to the NCAP catalogued 
holdings, since the interpretation reports detail the sortie references and frames used 
to elucidate intelligence, aerial photography created during Crossbow can now be 
identified.  By using the unpublished internal history of Operation Crossbow (see 
below),
46
 along with the interpretation reports - notably the BS Series
47
 - it is possible 
to construct a chronology of the interpretation effort during the operation to identify 
individual sorties and photographs containing specific intelligence.  It should be noted 
that when undertaking the research project the candidate took advantage of his 
position as the curator of NCAP to access un-catalogued aerial photographs created 
during Crossbow, as detailed in the book. As a consequence, a growing number are 
now publicly accessible via the NCAP website - http://ncap.org.uk/. 
 
In addition to the challenges of undertaking photographic interpretation, scholars of 
Second World War photographic intelligence face a further practical challenge: that 
of tracking down the whereabouts of all the surviving aerial photography detailed 
within interpretation reports. Photographic reconnaissance and intelligence was an 
inter-Allied activity in the European Theatre of Operations. In consequence, aerial 
photography of targets was undertaken by a range of Allied photographic 
reconnaissance squadrons and, as the American and Canadian
 
air forces selectively 
11 
 
repatriated their wartime aerial photography, the material that survives is scattered 
across multiple collections.  Notwithstanding this dispersal of the sources, the author 
was able to draw on the extensive archive of photographs relating to the operation in 
the NARA in the USA
48
 and is confident that this collection, together with that of the 
NCAP, gave him access to the majority of the Allied photographic intelligence 
gathered at the time. 
 
Unpublished histories and related documents 
 
A further important primary source for the research project was unpublished, internal 
wartime histories. These include a two-volume Air Historical Branch ‘RAF 
Narrative’, on the photographic reconnaissance and intelligence effort, which became 
publicly accessible via the Public Record Office in 1976.
49
  The first volume, written 
in 1945, covering the period to April 1941, provides a detailed chronology of pre-war 
clandestine and early-war photographic reconnaissance missions, official interactions 
with the Aircraft Operating Company, and the complex and unorthodox structure of 
the Photographic Interpretation Unit at Wembley.
50
  The second volume, written in 
1948, charts the growth of the photographic reconnaissance and intelligence effort 
until August 1945.
51
  The narrative is sufficiently detailed that individual 
photographic reconnaissance sorties are detailed and, alongside the aerial 
photography at NCAP, this enables scrutiny of the published historical interpretations.  
 
At the behest of the Air Historical Branch, internal histories were also compiled for 
each of the Medmenham sections in September 1945, including the Crossbow team 
(Section B2). These detail section name and code-name; date and circumstances of 
formation; staffing levels throughout the war; the scope of work undertaken; the title 
and reference number of key reports; and the distribution of these reports during the 
war.
52
  Particularly worthy of note is the official history of the Medmenham Print 
Library which explains the sortie referencing systems used throughout the conflict.
 53
  
This is invaluable for the deciphering of aerial photography and the associated 
interpretation reports.  
 
The internal history of Crossbow itself - Crossbow: History of the P.I. Investigation 
(1943-1945)
54
 - which draws on ‘notes on the contribution of photographic 
12 
 
interpretation to the Crossbow investigation’ written in October 1944 by the 
Medmenham Technical Control Officer, Wing Commander Douglas Kendall,
55
  
provides a further important summary of the work undertaken by the photographic 
interpreters.  Through a chronological presentation of the successive phases of the 
operation, it provides an overview of the network of sites throughout Nazi-occupied 
Europe associated with the development, manufacture, movement, storage and 
deployment of V-weapons.  This document serves as another important route-map by 
which to navigate the thousands of interpretation reports written during Operation 
Crossbow, and in-turn the 1.6 million aerial photographs created during 4,000 




Other internal wartime materials have been drawn upon to assist in the interpretation 
of relevant photographic intelligence relating to Crossbow. These comprise training 
manuals and related documents used by Allied photographic intelligence personnel 
which are variously held by the TNA, NARA and AFHRA. These include such items 
as the ‘Illustrated Handbook for Officers concerned with Examination and 
Interpretation of Air Photographs’,
57
 the ‘Report on Tactical Reconnaissance in 2
nd
 
Tactical Air Force’ and the ‘Report on Ground Organisation in Support of Air 
Photographs in 2
nd
 Tactical Air Force (1944-1945)’.
58
  These documents reveal, for 
example, that when photographic interpreters were trained during the war a useful 
distinction was made between ‘photograph reading’ and ‘photographic interpretation’. 
Whilst photograph reading was defined as the identification of common objects and 
topographical features in aerial photographs, and was likened to the comparatively 
simple process of reading a map, photographic interpretation was a much more 
complex task concerned with understanding the intelligence significance of a 
photograph.  
 
When analysing features in stereo on vertical aerial photographs, interpreters were 
thus instructed to consider five key factors when identifying and describing objects:  
shape (their physical form in geometrical terms); size (their physical dimensions); 
shadow (to determine their shape, outline and height); tone (the factors that determine 
tone variation); and associated features (when an object remains unidentified after all 
other factors have been considered). Photographic interpreters were also trained never 
to base a conclusion on conjecture, on the basis that military commanders must only 
13 
 
be presented with known facts.  If there was insufficient evidence to report findings 
with certainty, their intelligence assessment had to be qualified with the terms 
‘probable’ or ‘possible’.
59
   
 
Further useful background sources available in the TNA are the internal magazines 
devoted to wartime photographic intelligence.
60
 Between October 1942 and March 
1945 the Air Ministry produced a regular twenty-four-page magazine: ‘Evidence In 
Camera’.  Compiled at Medmenham, 103 issues appeared, including special editions 
on D-Day, the flying bomb, and the Mulberry harbours, with a final issue on how 
photographic reconnaissance and intelligence developed throughout the war.  As 
classified documents, the magazines chart the evolution of the air war in the European 
Theatre from an aerial perspective with a greater degree of candour than might 
otherwise be the case. Along similar lines, between April 1943 and September 1945 
the United States Army Air Force published Impact.  Available in NARA and 
AFHRA, approximately ninety per-cent of the 1,730 pages published in its thirty 





Operations Record Books (Form 540) 
 
Additional sources include Operations Record Books (ORBs) held by the TNA.
62
  
These documents incorporate the official operational record of each RAF unit or 
formation and include the photographic reconnaissance squadrons /wings /groups that 
took part in Crossbow.
63
 Whilst the level of detail contained within an ORB varies 
markedly depending on the compiler and the unit, and although references to some 
secret operations are notable by their absence, they are an invaluable chronological 
account of the relevant units.  In the case of the photographic reconnaissance 
squadrons, they often contain detailed information about individual sorties: sortie 
reference, sortie date, serial number of the aircraft, name of the pilot and navigator 
(when appropriate), flight time, purpose of the flight, details of the target(s) 
photographed, and other information worthy of note.  The sortie reference, for 
example, is most helpful in tracing the surviving photography and plotting at NCAP, 
as well as the associated interpretation report(s) at TNA. It is also sometimes possible 
to work out the identity of the photographic interpreter who elucidated the 
14 
 
intelligence.  The ORBs relating to Medmenham and its satellite stations, the 
Photographic Interpretation Unit and the 106 (Photographic Reconnaissance) Group, 




The extent to which wartime propaganda impacted on understandings of the role of 
photographic intelligence in Crossbow, and wartime photographic intelligence efforts 
more generally, was a further aspect of the research project and thus such material 
provides another relevant source. During the war, a Press and Publicity Section was 
established at Medmenham to select photographic intelligence suitable for release for 
propaganda purposes.  Working with the Air Ministry public relations branch (Branch 
PR3), chosen images were supplied, with suitable annotations and captions, to the 
Censorship Bureau at the Ministry of Information (MoI).  Indeed, aerial photography 
featured prominently in pamphlets and posters issued by local authorities, in 
illustrated magazines and newspapers, in exhibitions on bomb-damaged Germany, 
and in leaflets dropped over enemy-occupied territory (so-called ‘white bombs’).  
After the Dambusters raid in 1943, for example, such leaflets were dropped 
throughout Nazi-occupied Europe showing ‘before’ and ‘after’ aerial photographs of 




When the photographic library at the MoI’s Censorship Bureau was closed in 1946 
the aerial photography selected for wartime propaganda purposes became publicly 
accessible via the Imperial War Museum.  These photographs have, however, been 
uncritically used by historians, publishers and broadcasters. In reality, they provide a 
distorted version of photographic intelligence.
65
  To illustrate this, when analytical 
techniques developed by the National Photographic Interpretation Center at the 
Central Intelligence Agency to determine the ‘truthfulness’ of propaganda 
photographs during the Cold War
66
 are applied to the Censorship Bureau photographs 
they confirm that many were forged, faked or otherwise altered to suit the purposes of 
the wartime propagandists. This highlights the importance of comparing 
unadulterated photographs (held principally by NCAP and NARA) with manipulated 
images to discover what was hidden, eliminated or altered at the time in order to 




Another legacy of wartime propaganda was a generation whose knowledge of the war 
was strongly conditioned by the cinematic images to which they had been exposed.  
During the post-war decades photographic intelligence was portrayed in such films as 
the Malta Story (1953), Mosquito Squadron (1969) and A Bridge Too Far (1977). 
Most notably, in 1965 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer produced the epic Operation 
Crossbow.  Yet this film, partly inspired by the writings of Babington Smith, is a 
highly-fictionalised account of the operation and the role of wartime photographic 




Oral history was a further source utilised in the book. Clearly, such material has to be 
used with care. Apart from the issue of age clouding memory, difficulties sometimes 
arise when veterans fill the gaps in their narrow personal experiences with 
information from other sources. These can include popular wartime myths or 
inaccurate anecdotes which find their way into general histories and poorly-
researched film accounts to be absorbed and re-told, thus creating a ‘feedback loop’ 
of misinformation. Many a war story, widely repeated and acquiring in the repetition 
the status of ‘historical fact’, is found to stem from unsupported anecdote
67
 or 
‘recollections’ which sometime owe as much to mental images absorbed from scenes 
in Hollywood movies.
 
 Yet, with due diligence, oral history can provide valuable 
historical insights. 
 
Although few veterans involved with wartime photographic intelligence were 
interviewed for the Imperial War Museum’s oral history collections,
68
 in recent years 
volunteer members of the Medmenham Association have interviewed additional 
veterans which have added to our understanding of their wartime roles.  An 
opportunity to supplement this work arose in 2010 when the BBC commissioned a 
documentary on Operation Crossbow.
69
  For the author, who worked as a research 
consultant for the BBC production team, this programme provided an opportunity to 
garner further personal testimony from surviving veterans.  When the documentary 
became a co-production with the Public Broadcast Service (PBS) in the USA, this 





  The BBC and PBS documentaries, broadcast in May 
2011
71
 and January 2012 respectively,
72
 furnish important personal narratives about 
wartime photographic intelligence, with a particular focus on Crossbow. 
 
Some conclusions can be drawn from these recollections about the relative value of 
veteran testimony for the historian of photographic intelligence. For example, the 
second-phase photographic interpreters,
73
 whose sub-teams monitored such targets as 
shipping, airfields and railways on a day-to-day basis, acquired a detailed tactical 
understanding of the composition, disposition and strength of enemy activity. In 
contrast, the specialist teams of third-phase interpreters, who systematically collated 
data from their analysis of aerial photography with a view to spotting emerging 
trends, developed a more strategic knowledge of wartime operations. But having said 
that, when Major Geoffrey Stone was interviewed he observed that the fragmented 
organisation of Medmenham, and policy of only sharing information on a need-to-
know basis, coupled with inter-service, sectional and personal rivalries, meant that 




The interviews undertaken by Babington Smith for Evidence in Camera,
75
 now 
located in the Medmenham Collection, are another significant source of information.  
Throughout 1956 and 1957, Babington Smith interviewed senior British and 
American participants in photographic intelligence during the Second World War, on 
both sides of the Atlantic.  These included most of the senior interpreters involved in 
Crossbow, notably Douglas Kendall, Neil Simon, Robert Rowell, and Hugh 
Hamshaw Thomas. She did not use audio recording equipment, but instead took 
verbatim notes during the interviews.
76
  For a study of wartime photographic 
intelligence, these interview notes are an indispensable starting point for 




Most useful for this study was the memoir of Wing Commander Douglas Kendall, the 
Technical Control Officer at Medmenham. Written in the 1980s, after the revelations 
about Bletchley Park, ‘A War of Intelligence’ was intended for publication, but never 
appeared.
 77
  Now housed in the Medmenham Collection, it reinforced the notion that 
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R. V. Jones misrepresented the contribution of photographic interpretation to the 
success of Crossbow, and photographic intelligence more generally. Since it was 
written by the highest ranking photographic interpreter at Medmenham, who was the 
only member of the staff to be Ultra-cleared, and who was involved across the whole 
spectrum of Allied military intelligence activity, this memoir is a most valuable 




Following a prologue, Operation Crossbow is arranged chronologically, with chapters 
covering the period before, during, and after, Crossbow. The first ‘section’ (if one can 
describe it as such) includes chapters one to four and introduces the concerns of 
British intelligence about the German secret weapons capability early in the war; the 
development of British photographic reconnaissance during pre-war SIS and early-
war RAF missions; the technical reliance on the civilian Aircraft Operating Company 
Limited for photographic interpretation services given the failure of British 
intelligence to maintain a capability during the inter-war years; the requisition of this 
company and role of Winston Churchill in engineering this; the creation of the Central 
Interpretation Unit at Medmenham in April 1941 and its continued expansion in 1942 
when it was concerned with the planning stages of practically every major operation.  
By covering the private-sector origins of wartime photographic intelligence, the 
reader is introduced in the early chapters to some of the civilian photographic 
interpreters who were central characters in Crossbow; and by charting the 
organisational structure and diverse range of specialist teams at Medmenham it equips 
the reader with the background knowledge required to understand the photographic 
interpretation effort during the search for V-weapons. 
 
The second ‘section’, which is the main focus of book and incorporates chapters five 
to thirteen, provides a detailed case study of the role of photographic intelligence 
during Crossbow.  With concern about secret weapons re-ignited in early 1943 by 
secretly bugging the conversations of German officers in captivity, as well as through 
intelligence from secret agents, these chapters cover the appointment of Duncan 
Sandys MP to investigate the rocket weapons threat; the disagreement amongst senior 
scientists over whether a liquid-fuelled rocket was a technical possibility; and the War 
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Cabinet decision to approve Operation HYDRA, the Bomber Command raid on 
Peenemunde, near Zinnowitz in northern Germany. As the battle against the V-
weapons intensified throughout 1943 and 1944, a detailed chronological study is 
provided of the interpretation work undertaken at Medmenham to identify and 
monitor the network of V-weapons’ sites throughout Europe. In order to draw 
conclusions about the complex relationship between Medmenham and the various 
Whitehall establishments involved in the assessment of German secret weapons’ 
capabilities, an account is provided of the often-cryptic briefings that were passed to 
Medmenham and the corresponding challenges for the photographic interpreters. By 
chronologically following the investigation, and informed by a close study of aerial 
photography, associated interpretation reports, other primary sources identified 
through archival research, and the conventions which dictated how photographic 
intelligence was reported, claims about the veracity of the photographic interpretation 
effort in Crossbow are considered. 
 
In the final ‘section’ of the book, which includes chapter fourteen and the epilogue, 
the wider lessons learned from the application of photographic intelligence by the 
Allies and Germans during the Second World War are considered.  The importance of 
captured German Luftwaffe aerial photography for Anglo-American target 
intelligence, and the value placed on continued co-operation in photographic 
intelligence, is considered in order that its value to the air intelligence relationship 
during the early Cold War can be assessed.  The book ends with an account of what 
happened to the enormous volume of aerial photography held by the RAF at 
Medmenham and the chain of events that led to the location of NCAP in Edinburgh. 
 
 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
A review of Operation Crossbow by John Ingham appeared in The Daily Express in 
June 2013. The reviewer praised the book as ‘a fascinating and scholarly account of a 
secret sideshow of the war’. However, he also pointed out ‘one weakness’ of the 
volume. That was that ‘it reads at time like an academic tome’.
78
 Hopefully, this 
apparent criticism can be regarded more favourably in the context of this critical 




In broad terms the book relates how a team of photographic interpreters based at a 
country house in Medmenham on the banks of the Thames uncovered the secrets of 
the Germans’ V-weapons programme, so enabling countermeasures to be deployed 
which saved thousands of lives. In so doing, it provides a wealth of information on 
such matters as the wartime development of photographic interpretation, the 
techniques used by the interpreters, the personalities involved, the significance of 
aerial intelligence to Crossbow, and the wider politics of wartime intelligence. These 
matters have much academic merit in themselves. However, more particularly, the 
volume also addresses two research questions outlined earlier. 
 
Research question 1: On the basis of the intelligence briefings provided, and the 
conventions under which they operated, are the claims made by Jones about the 
competency of their photographic interpretation effort during Operation Crossbow 
reasonable? 
 
During the Second World War the working relationship between the Air Ministry’s 
Assistant Director of Intelligence (Science), Dr. R. V. Jones, and the Medmenham 
interpreters was frequently strained.  This strain was at its height during the hunt for 
the V-weapons.  Evidence of this fractious relationship is clear in Jones’s wartime 
memoir.
79
 He obviously resented the fact he was not chosen to lead the investigation 
and capitalised on any opportunity to discredit the photographic interpreters involved 
in Crossbow.
80
 First, he lambasted the interpretation of aerial photography at the 
outset of the investigation, claiming the Medmenham interpreters failed to identify a 
rocket at the Peenemunde experimental site.
81
  Second, he challenged the story of the 
identification of a V-1 flying bomb on a ramp at the same experimental site by the 
interpreters in L Section as being merely an ‘accidental discovery’.
82
 Instead, he took 
much of the credit for discovering it himself. Third, he criticised the failure of the 
Medmenham interpreters to spot a rocket on aerial photography of the Blizna 
experimental site.
83
  It is contended that since Jones’s memoirs have been influential 
in historical assessments of the role of photographic interpretation in Crossbow, the 
book’s attempt to determine the veracity of these claims through an analysis of the 




Failure to spot a rocket at Peenemunde 
 
At the outset of the Crossbow investigation in April 1943, the photographic 
interpreter, Flight Lieutenant André Kenny, was tasked with searching for 
information about rocket testing at Peenemunde (in modern-day Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern). During the initial weeks of the investigation, Kenny and the 
interpreters involved in the hunt for long-range rockets were advised by government 
scientists from the Ministries of Supply and Economic Warfare - rather than by R. V. 
Jones and his colleagues in scientific intelligence – as what to look for in the aerial 
photography.
84
  At this stage, the emphasis was placed on the rocket threat and any 
suggestion that new weapons other than rockets might be involved was discounted.  
Moreover, the interpreters were instructed to look for launching rails and were 
advised that due to the weight of the rockets any Crossbow-related sites would be rail-
served.   
 
The archives reveal that, when the investigation began, this remote part of the Baltic 
coast in northern Germany had been photographed during four sorties: A/762 on 15 
May 1942; N/709 on 19 January 1943; N/756 on 1 March 1943, and N/807 on 22 
April 1943.
85
 Using this aerial photography, Kenny examined the Peenemunde site 
and initially decided that installations photographed at the airfield were ‘sludge-
pumping equipment’ related to land reclamation.
86
  This miscalculation, along with 
the pre-war rejection of Kenny’s Cambridge PhD on hydraulic engineering in ancient 
Greece and Rome, combined with his engineering work on land drainage in the 
England fens, made him and his Medmenham colleagues an easy target for Jones.
87
 
To add insult to injury, Jones credited himself as being the first person to spot a rocket 
at Peenemunde when, on 18 June, he was studying aerial photography created during 
sortie N/853 flown six days earlier.  He castigated the photographic interpreters for 
having ‘missed it’.
88
   
 
However, the book comes to the aid of Kenny. On 14 May 1943, a photographic 
reconnaissance mission was flown over Peenemunde, sortie N/825, from which a 
detailed study of the elliptical earthworks and related structures was possible.  In the 
associated interpretation report, Kenny recorded having spotted a column of five 
vehicles and that ‘the middle vehicle appears to carry a cylindrical object thirty-eight 
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feet by eight, which projects over the next truck’.  On re-examination of the earlier 
photographs, he noted that similar objects could be seen and that activity over the 
whole site was intensive.
89
 Furthermore, a detailed third-phase interpretation report of 
16 June 1943 written by Kenny about sortie N/853 proves that he first spotted the 
rocket and identified it as an ‘object’ that measured thirty feet by eight feet.
90
  When 
later commenting on the controversy, he claimed never to have doubted that it was a 
rocket but, not being a scientist, was constrained by the fact that interpreters were 
forbidden to speculate about objects until their existence had been officially 
accepted.
91
  It is reasonable to suggest that Kenny was unfairly pilloried by Jones for 
simply not spelling out the word ‘rocket’ and the value of photographic intelligence 
during the operation was thus unreasonably slandered by Jones.   
 
V-1 flying bombs at Peenemunde 
 
Jones recorded in his memoir that a Bois Carré-type launching site at Zinnowitz in 
northern Germany, close to the nearby Peenumunde facility, was identified by a 
French agent Jeannie Rousseau (code-named Amniarix).  Jones claimed that this 
revelation prompted him to request a photographic reconnaissance sortie of the area, 
sortie N/980 on 28 November 1943, in the hope that it would establish a definitive 
connection between the network of Bois Carré-type sites in northern France and 
Peenemunde. Furthermore, Jones suggested that by intercepting German radar tracks, 
which indicated when the Germans were firing projectiles, he recommended the 
optimum time of day for the sortie to be flown over Zinnowitz and Peenemunde 
thereby giving the best chance of photographing a pilotless aircraft in-situ.
92
 Thus 
when Babington Smith and others thought that the important discovery of a V-1 on a 
ramp at Peenemunde, ready to be launched, had been a lucky break, Jones was able to 
claim it had all been the result of careful calculation.
93
    
The chain of events that can be deduced from the evidence, however, suggests a 
different picture. Following a briefing on 3 November 1943 from Colonel Terence 
Sanders, the Director of Technical Development at the Ministry of Supply, that the 
Germans might be planning to deploy projectiles, possibly launched from two rails 
inclined at a steep angle,
94
 Douglas Kendall tasked L Section - led by Flight Officer 
Babington Smith - with re-studying activity at Peenemunde in the hope that the 
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aircraft specialists could identify the projectile and associated launch ramps.
95
  
Revisiting the aerial photography of the experimental station, they duly spotted a 
small object, not beside the airfield but in a small enclosure behind the aircraft 
hangars, immediately adjoining a building the interpreters suspected was being used 
for jet engine testing.  With a wingspan of only twenty feet it was christened 
‘Peenemunde 20’.  
Meanwhile, to develop their understanding of the uniformly-constructed Bois Carré 
sites - and through a masterful example of photographic interpretation - Kendall 
analysed each of the buildings in turn and developed the hypothesis that the two 
longer ski-buildings were used to store the main body of a projectile and the shorter 
structure housed the wings. Since the platforms on the sites pointed towards London 
(the direction became known as the London Line), Southampton, Bristol and 
Portsmouth, the likelihood of this being a launch site of some form of projectile was 
thought high.  
When Babington Smith showed Kendall a ramp spotted near the Peenemunde airfield, 
and Kendall confirmed its association with the ‘Peenemunde 20’, the third-phase 
interpreters began searching the photography from the Medmenham Print Library to 
understand the chronological development of the Peenmunde site. Photography from 
January 1943 revealed one completed firing site and a second under construction, 
while photography from May 1943 showed that the second site had been completed.  
When the most recent photographs from sortie N/980 were analysed by the aircraft 
specialists, on examining frame 4031, which covered the ramps at the start of the 
photographic run over Peenemunde (unfortunately no stereo pair had been taken), 
they could see a cruciform object at the bottom of a ramp. Medmenham thus had 
irrefutable evidence of a ‘Peenemunde 20’ sitting on a ramp, ready to be fired.
96
  In 
Interpretation Report BS164, Kendall was also able to record the signature marks left 
by pilotless aircraft that had crash-landed into the estuary sands.
97
 
A study of the Operations Record Book for 540 Squadron seems to contest Jones’s 
version of events. The key sortie, N/980, was flown by Squadron Leader John 
Merifield, alongside his navigator Flying Officer, William Whalley, in a de Havilland 
Mosquito.
 
They are recorded to have departed from RAF Leuchars at 09:55, on a 
flight that lasted six hours and ten minutes. The stated purpose of the mission was a 
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post-strike photographic reconnaissance of Berlin.  On reaching the German capital 
that morning, and discovering their target was obs cured by 10/10 cloud cover, they 
then photographed alternative high-priority targets in surrounding areas.
98
 The 
Medmenham-created sortie plot records these as Stettin, where the Kriegsmarine’s 
one and only aircraft carrier the Graf Zeppelin was docked; Swinnemunde, where 
they photographed the German crusier Admiral Scheer; airfields at Anklam, 
Greifswald and Stralsund; and vertical and oblique photography of the Peenemunde 
area, including the coastline near Zinnowitz.
99
 
When Babington Smith interviewed Merifield during research for her book on 
wartime photographic intelligence, his testimony confirmed the official record of this 
being an aborted damage-assessment sortie, and provided evidence that the 
Peenemunde airfield was merely a target of opportunity, a means to ‘finish up an odd 
bit of film on the way back’, and that no briefing had been provided about 
photographing a specific geographical point at a specific time.
100
  As this witness 
testimony matches the sequence of frames on the original roll of film from the sortie, 
which was declassified and released into the public domain between 2004 and 
2008,
101
 the veracity of Jones’s account is brought into serious question.  The case 
against him is further reinforced by the fact that the highest priority would have been 
afforded a photographic reconnaissance sortie that could have provided the evidence 
linking Peenemunde with the Bois Carré sites in France.  Indeed, it would have surely 
involved a careful briefing of the aircrew involved in such a mission, a briefing Jones 
himself provided on many other occasions during the war.
102
  When the evidence is 
considered, the suspicion is that Jones had a tendency to embroider the facts. 
Moreover, his account serves greatly to undermine the achievements of Kendall and L 
Section. Their masterful photographic interpretations, particularly given how little 
information was available to them, provided one of the most important and dramatic 
intelligence breakthroughs of the war.    
 
Failure to spot a rocket at Blizna 
Jones, unlike the Medmenham interpreters (with the sole exception of Douglas 
Kendall), had unrestricted access to Ultra-derived intelligence. This revealed that the 
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Germans were sending geräte (apparatus) between Peenemunde and Blizna (another 
experimental site in Poland).  In the hope of proving a connection between the two 
sites Jones recorded in his memoir that one evening in early July 1944 he analysed 
copies of aerial photographs taken during sortie 60PR/385 over Blizna on 5 May 
1944.
103
  This was after Medmenham had already drawn up its own interpretation 
report of the photographs taken during the sortie.
104
 Looking at frame 3240, and its 
associated stereo-pair, he identified a rocket ninety millimeters down from the top of 
the frame and twenty-six millimetres in from the right-hand edge.  Jones then directly 
informed the Chiefs of Staff and Lord Cherwell about his discovery, in the process 




The book shows this to be a very partial view of the situation. The evidence indicates 
that although the photographic interpreters at Medmenham did in fact report the 
presence of railway wagons similar in appearance to ones spotted at the experimental 
sites at Peenemunde and Friedrichshafen, they had never been warned that signals 
intelligence indicated that rocket experiments were taking place at Blizna. This meant 
the location had never been thoroughly investigated from that perspective. 
Furthermore, they were not even asked to provide an opinion on the photographed 
object submitted to the Chiefs of Staff as being a rocket.
106
 Indeed, Kendall dryly 
noted to his RAF superiors that on subsequent investigation the object in question at 
Blizna could be a rocket (which the candidate’s examination of the original 
photography confirms it was), but this was by no means certain and there was a 
possibility it was merely an excavator.
107
 Kendall’s superiors, in turn, advised the Air 
Ministry that the passing of amateur efforts at photographic interpretation to the 
Chiefs of Staff was ‘undesirable’ because it was the surest method of discrediting 
photographic intelligence. 
This episode also highlighted a constant problem suffered by the Medmenham 
interpreters during the war: that of not having access to all the available intelligence 
that existed.
108
 This certainly allowed Jones to discredit the interpreters’ skill while at 
the same time glossing over the fact that while it was easy to look it was not always so 
easy to see, particularly if one did not know what one was looking for. This was 
particularly the case during Crossbow given that the interpreters were hunting for a 
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new technology. Overall, and in short, the book therefore finds that Jones’s memoirs 
cannot be taken as a reliable guide to the role of photographic intelligence during the 
operation. 
 
Research Question 2: What can a study of Crossbow tell us about the importance of 
British photographic intelligence during the Second World War, and can it be 
considered a significant ‘missing dimension’ of academic intelligence studies? 
 
The book shows that photographic intelligence was indeed a vital source of wartime 
military intelligence. It was certainly not without its limitations and it could not 
provide all the evidence required when planning military operations.  Photographic 
reconnaissance, for example, was frequently impotent during periods of bad weather, 
or when targets were beyond aircraft range.  Nevertheless, the information held within 
the millions of aerial photographs accumulated in the wartime Medmenham Print 
Library enabled interpreters to undertake vital analysis of enemy activity over time.  
This resource proved to be of particular importance during the planning of major 
military operations - and never more so than during Crossbow - when detailed 
chronological intelligence was required.  And since vital intelligence could be 
extracted through the re-interpretation of existing photography, this usefully avoided 
the security risks associated with increasing the flow of information from other 
intelligence sources.  The scale of the photographic reconnaissance effort made this 
possible and ensured that very little of major importance passed unrecorded. This 
made the Medmenham Library a unique A1 source of military intelligence during the 
Second World War. 
 
The fact that aerial photography was regularly undertaken before operations to inform 
the planning stages - and during/afterwards to assess the outcome(s) – highlights the 
importance placed on this intelligence source during the war.  So does the growth in 
scale of the photographic reconnaissance effort in the European Theatre. This is borne 
out by the enormous scale of the undertaking, in terms of highly-trained personnel, 
the development of purpose-designed aircraft, and the wherewithal to produce and 
distribute millions of photographic images.  From the handful of individuals involved 
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in high-altitude unarmed photographic reconnaissance at the outset of the conflict, 
thirteen squadrons – five in the RAF, five in the United States Army Air Force, and 
three in the Royal Canadian Air Force – were allotted to strategic photographic 
reconnaissance.  In addition to their efforts, every bomber - whether by day or night - 
and coastal patrol aircraft carried an aerial camera.  All this photography was 
despatched to Medmenham, where the photographic coverage held was so total and 
frequent that remarkably complete information could be deduced for many targets.
109
   
 
As for the wider question of intelligence studies, in recent years there has been an 
upsurge of interest in the Second World War in popular culture, historical fiction, 
television documentaries and film productions.  This trend is reflected in academia, 
where the rise of social and cultural histories of the war have seen a new generation of 
academic historians begin the lengthy process of disentangling truth from wartime 
propaganda and post-war mythology.
110
  But, as has been demonstrated above, this 
process of historical revisionism has only just reached the field of wartime 
photographic intelligence.  At the same time, whilst the validity of ‘intelligence 
studies’ as a distinct academic entity has been challenged on the grounds it may be 
more of a bureaucratic-academic construct, rather than an academic-intellectual 
one,
111
 academic intelligence studies has been identified as a rapidly evolving 
discipline in its own right  - ‘one of the fastest growing subsets of international 
history, political science and strategic studies’
112
 - which has successfully jostled for 
space and recognition among a myriad of other academic disciplines.  This growth 
was understandably accelerated by the declassification of British and American 
intelligence records following the decline and fall of Soviet Communism, and the 
conclusion of the Cold War.  As the initial growth and focus of academic writing on 
intelligence was characterised by a desire for discovery, it is understandable why the 
eagerness to move from the eradication of one ‘missing dimension’ to the next has led 
to some lacunae in research. One can argue that the systematic study of wartime 
photographic intelligence has itself become ‘a missing dimension’. 
 
In chapter 14, ‘Open Skies’, and the epilogue, the book provides an account of what 
happened to the large volume of aerial photography accumulated by the RAF during 
the war, the development of Anglo-American photographic intelligence in the early 
Cold War era, the restrictive caveats that were placed on public accessibility to this 
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aerial photography, and the ramifications which eventually led to the location of 
NCAP in Edinburgh.  In so doing, the book provides evidence of why British 
photographic intelligence during the Second World War became a ‘missing 
dimension’ of academic intelligence studies and, given the wide range of intelligence 
questions that were answered by photographic interpretation during the conflict, the 
potential of military-declassified aerial photography to transform our understanding of 
historical events.   
 
Although, as has been alluded to above, the tens-of-thousands of photographic 
interpretation reports created at Medmenham became publicly accessible in TNA in 
the 1970s, the wartime aerial reconnaissance photography, which could not be viewed 
alongside them, severely limited researchers’ capacity to develop a knowledge and 
understanding of this important historical source. Although batches of wartime aerial 
photography were declassified during the Cold War, security and foreign policy 
considerations compounded the problems of access and ensured that millions of 
wartime images remained classified and inaccessible (in particular those covering 
Soviet bloc countries). Moreover, further accessibility challenges stemmed from the 
absence of a comprehensive cataloguing system for the Medmenham Print Library. 
This meant that when a collection of photographs was released by JARIC to the 
University College of North Staffordshire (now Keele University) in the early 1960s, 
there was no means to discover photographs of particular places, taken on particular 
dates, by particular squadrons, or relating to particular subjects.  This was 
compounded by the fact that no information about what wartime photography had 
been withheld, or destroyed, was in the public domain. It was only in the 1970s that 
systems began to be developed to make the collection searchable.
113
  Following the 
collapse of Soviet Communism, further photography was released to Keele 
University. But, once again, the lack of a search facility limited its usefulness and 
JARIC was not prepared to share its own finding aids. 
 
The problem of accessibility, and searchability, only began to be resolved with the 
bulk declassification of aerial photography by the Ministry of Defence – some 20 
million in total - to NCAP between 2004 and 2008. To provide a means of searching 
the collection, approximately 12,000 3M microfilm cassettes were provided by 
JARIC.
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 Developed progressively since the autumn of 1967, this microfilm 
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collection was created in tandem with the computerisation of cover-searching.  This 
involved an Automatic Storage Retrieval Section inputting the geographical co-
ordinates for each aerial photograph from sortie plotting into a database.  Thereafter, 
sortie-by-sortie, JARIC photographers created a microfilm copy of each aerial image 
and the associated sortie plotting (which was subsequently destroyed).
115
  When 
photography of a particular location was required, the database was interrogated with 
the latitude and longitude of a target area and details of available photography were 
provided.  Using the microfilm, it was then possible for the photographic interpreters 
to view frames of aerial photography on a microfilm reader in order that the required 
film(s) and frame(s) could be selected for detailed photographic interpretation.
116  
The 
digital revolution and growing availability of digital technology, particularly digital 
photography, has subsequently transformed both accessibility to the collection and the 
capacity to cost-effectively create high-resolution digital copies of the photography.  
With searches powered by geo-data, the collection is now becoming progressively 
searchable via a Geographical Information System and via the NCAP website - 
http://ncap.org.uk/. 
 
The release of the aerial photography to NCAP thus represented a watershed moment 
and transformed the capacity of intelligence historians, military historians and others 
to utilise aerial photography as a means to help disentangle ‘truths’ about the conflict 
from wartime propaganda and post-war mythology. Indeed, the intellectual challenge 
for the historian is analogous with the basic function of a wartime intelligence unit.  
In the ‘war of wits’, intelligence services collected and procured information from 
sources, evaluated their reliability and trustworthiness, and the probability of the 
information being ‘true’.  Whilst the reliability of sources was rated with the letters A 
to D (with A indicating that a source was highly reliable, and D indicating that it was 
from an unreliable or untested source), the probability of the information being ‘true’ 
was rated with numerals from 1 to 4 (with 1 indicating that the information was 
highly probable, accurate and corroborated, and 4 that it was improbable or 
inaccurate).
117
  As the amount of reliable and accurate information during the conflict 
was never sufficient, photographic intelligence became highly prized for its capacity 
to help answer intelligence questions and, given the extent to which it informed 
military decision-making, the re-interpretation of declassified aerial photography 
provides a most fruitful means both to re-consider the merit of those decisions and 
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potentially transform our understanding of wartime events. The ‘missing dimension’ 






The two main sources of primary information cited in this critical review are The National 
Archives (TNA) and the Medmenham Collection (MDM).  References to TNA records 
commence with ‘TNA’, and are followed by the department code, series number, piece 
number, and where appropriate the item number (e.g. TNA AIR 34/75/1B).  References to 
MDM sources commence with ‘MDM’ and are followed by class and item number (e.g. 
MDM DFG/5701).   
 
The following abbreviations are used in the notes: 
 
ACIU Allied Central Interpretation Unit 
AIR Air Ministry 
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation 
CIU Central Interpretation Unit 
IWM Imperial War Museum 
ORB Operations Record Book 
MDM Medmenham Collection 
NCAP National Collection of Aerial Photography 
PBS Public Broadcasting Service 
RAF Royal Air Force 
TNA The National Archives 
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